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Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, Denial of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance Publication: Federal Register Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Byline: Anne L. Collins Date: 22 March 2023 Subjects: American Government  , Safety, Trucking
Topic: Freightliner Cascadia |
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 55 (Wednesday, March 22, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17291-17295]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-05901]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA-2020-0063; Notice 2]
Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, Denial of Petition for
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Denial of petition.
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SUMMARY: Daimler Trucks North America, LLC (DTNA), has determined that
certain model year (MY) 2020-2021 Freightliner Cascadia motor vehicles
(heavy trucks) do not fully comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated
Equipment. DTNA filed a noncompliance report dated May 12, 2020, and
amended the report on December 23, 2021. DTNA subsequently petitioned
NHTSA (the ``Agency'') on June 4, 2020, and later amended its petition
on July 13, 2020, and again on January 19, 2022, for a decision that
the subject noncompliances are inconsequential as they relate to motor
vehicle safety. This notice announces the denial of DTNA's petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Leroy Angeles, Office of Vehicle
Safety Compliance, NHTSA, (202) 366-5304.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Overview
DTNA has determined that certain MY 2020-2021 Freightliner Cascadia
heavy trucks do not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs
S4, S6.1.5.1, S9.6.2, S14.9.3.9.3, and Figure 2 of FMVSS No. 108,
Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment (49 CFR 571.108).
DTNA filed a noncompliance report dated May 12, 2020, and amended the
report on December 23, 2021, pursuant to 49 CFR part 573, Defect and
Noncompliance Responsibility and Reports. DTNA subsequently petitioned
NHTSA on June 4, 2020, and later amended its petition on July 13,
2020,\1\ and again on January 19, 2022, for an exemption from the
notification and remedy requirements of 49 U.S.C. chapter 301 on the
basis that these noncompliances are inconsequential as they relate to
motor vehicle safety, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h) and
49 CFR part 556, Exemption for Inconsequential Defect or Noncompliance.
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\1\ DTNA initially amended its petition on July 13, 2022, and
DTNA subsequently resubmitted that amended petition on July 22,
2022, due to an incorrect date on the top of the amended petition.
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Notice of receipt of DTNA's petition was published with a 30-day
public comment period, on April 13, 2022, in the Federal Register (87
FR 22019). No comments were received. To view the petition and all
supporting documents log onto the Federal Docket Management System
(FDMS) website at https://www.regulations.gov/. Then follow the online
search instructions to locate docket number ``NHTSA-2020-0063.''
II. Trucks Involved
Approximately 24,282 MY 2020-2021 Freightliner Cascadia heavy
trucks manufactured between January 16, 2019, and March 27, 2020, are
potentially involved.
III. Noncompliances
DTNA identified two noncompliances pertaining to the subject
trucks' hazard warning signal lamps. First, the hazard warning signal
lamps do not meet the flash rate required by paragraph S6.1.5.1 of
FMVSS No. 108 under all operating conditions. Specifically, if a
subject vehicle is operated at a speed of 20 miles per hour \2\ (MPH)
or more during the emergency braking (EB) phase of an Active Brake
Assist (ABA) event, the subject trucks' hazard warning signal lamps are
actuated at a flash rate of 140 flashes per minute when the flash rate
should be between 60 and 120 flashes per minute. Second, the subject
truck automatically activates the hazard warning signal lamps during
certain operating conditions, specifically, when the subject truck has
progressed to the third phase of an ABA event. Automatic activation of
the hazard warning signal lamps is contrary to the definition of the
``vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit,'' which states it is
a driver-controlled device.
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\2\ DTNA's initial petition cited a number in kilometers per
hour. However, documents that DTNA provided to NHTSA at later dates
cited numbers in miles per hour and, therefore, the Agency uses
miles per hour in this section. Regardless, the activation speed
threshold was not a factor in NHTSA's decision since the activation
in general was the concern.
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IV. Rule Requirements
Paragraphs S4, S6.1.5.1, S9.6.2, S14.9.3.9.3, and Figure 2 of FMVSS
No. 108 include the requirements relevant to this petition. Paragraph
S4 defines the ``vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit'' as a
driver-controlled device that causes all required turn signal lamps to
flash simultaneously to indicate to approaching drivers the presence of
a vehicular hazard. Paragraph S6.1.5.1 requires that ``[i]n all
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses, the
activation of the vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit must
cause to flash simultaneously sufficient turn signal lamps to meet, as
a minimum, the turn signal photometric requirements of this standard.''
Paragraph S9.6.2, in part, requires that the vehicular hazard warning
signal operating unit must provide a means for actuating all switches
simultaneously by a single driver action. Paragraph S14.9.3.9.3, in
part, requires that the flash rate cannot exceed 120 flashes per minute
under the conditions shown in Figure 2.
[[Page 17292]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN22MR23.005
V. Summary of DTNA's Petition
The views and arguments presented in this section summarize the
views and arguments provided by DTNA in its petition, including
amendments. They do not reflect the views of the Agency. DTNA describes
the subject noncompliances and states its belief that the
noncompliances are inconsequential as they relate to motor vehicle
safety.
A. Noncompliance With FMVSS No. 108's Flash Rate Requirement
DTNA identifies the three phases of an Active Brake Assist (ABA)
event as follows: the Optic Acoustic Warning (OAW) phase, the Warn
(Haptic) Braking (WB/HB) phase, and the EB phase. DTNA explains that
the first phase--the OAW phase--warns the operator of a possible
collision with a pop-up and audio alert only. The truck will then move
into the second phase--the WB/HB phase--to assist the driver in
mitigating a possible collision if the driver does not apply sufficient
deceleration to the service brakes by applying 50 percent deceleration
to the vehicle. DTNA further explains that ``[i]f the system deems it
necessary,'' the ABA will start the third phase--the EB phase--which
applies maximum braking force to assist the driver in bringing the
truck to a complete halt. Additionally, DTNA states that the warning
system only engages during this third phase, and, therefore, the third
phase is the only time when the hazard warning signal lamps are
automatically activated at a flash rate that exceeds the allowable
limit.
DTNA provides background information, detailing the development of
its ABA system,\3\ which is not reiterated here. DTNA states that its
findings show that an EB event is an extremely rare scenario that is
visible only for a short period of time in only the rarest of extreme
braking events, and the amount of time that drivers of other vehicles
might notice this noncompliance is negligible. DTNA states that the
average EB event lasts less than 1 second, and in millions of miles of
recorded data, the longest EB event observed lasted less than 3
seconds. Therefore, DTNA concludes that the difference in number of
blink cycles between the maximum permissible flash rate and emergency
braking flash rate on the subject trucks is minimal.
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\3\ Details of DTNA's ABA development can be found in its
petition at https://www.regulations.gov/document/NHTSA-2020-0063-0002.
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With respect to the noncompliant flash rate, DTNA further contends
that the flashing warning lights provide drivers of other vehicles with
a safe indication of the aggressiveness of the braking. DTNA claims
that NHTSA has previously found that under certain extreme braking
events, flashing warning lights may be regarded as a safe indicator for
rear signaling, citing a NHTSA study, which stated that ``a rear-
signaling system that extinguishes somewhat after a vehicle comes to a
complete stop should provide benefit by reducing a substantial
percentage of collisions with stopped lead vehicles, while reducing
annoyance caused by extended signaling after a vehicle is stopped. Data
suggest this type of signal would address approximately 45 percent (10
out of 22) of stopped-lead-vehicle crashes.'' \4\ DTNA notes that the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has granted an
approval for hazmat hauler tanker trucks to use amber brake activated
lights, following a 30-month study by Groendyke Transportation, which
found that a pulsating amber brake light reduced rear-end collisions by
roughly 34 percent.\5\
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\4\ DTNA cites Analyses of Rear-End Crashes and Near-Crashes in
the 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study to Support Rear-Signaling
Countermeasure Development. DOT HS 810 846 (October 2007).
\5\ See Groendyke Transportation's application for exemption
containing the 30-month study, FMCSA's decision and all associated
documents at https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2018-0223.
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Additionally, DTNA says that NHTSA has previously granted petitions
for noncompliances, similar to the subject noncompliant flash rate,\6\
where those noncompliances only occur ``under specific and rare
conditions,'' \7\ and ``were granted for short duration of
occurrence.'' \8\
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\6\ See General Motors Corporation; Grant of Application for
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 66 FR 32871 (June 18,
2001).
\7\ See General Motors, LLC, Grant of Petition for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 83 FR 7847 (February 22, 2018) and
General Motors, LLC, Grant of Petition for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 35355 (June 12, 2013).
\8\ See Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Grant of Petition for
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 84 FR 8151 (March 6,
2019), Maserati S.p.A and Maserati North America, Inc., Grant of
Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 81 FR 1676
(January 13, 2016), and General Motors Corporation; Grant of
Application for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 61 FR
56734 (November 4, 1996).
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DTNA states that it is not aware of any accidents, injuries, owner
complaints or field reports in relation to the subject noncompliances.
[[Page 17293]]
B. Noncompliance Due to Automatic Activation of Hazard Warning Signal
Lamps
On September 13, 2021,\9\ NHTSA contacted DTNA to discuss the
automatic activation of the hazard warning signal lamps. DTNA clarified
that based on an analysis of prior Agency interpretations, it believed
that the ``limited technical parameters and operating conditions under
which the hazard warning lamps would activate'' did not constitute a
noncompliance with FMVSS No. 108. NHTSA informed DTNA that the prior
interpretations did not support DTNA's position because the subject
trucks ``have not come to a complete stop at the time the hazard
warning lamps activate.'' As a result, DTNA amended its original
petition to include the automatic activation of the hazard warning
signal lamps as a second noncompliance.
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\9\ Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, Receipt of Petition for
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance (87 FR 22019) published on
April 13, 2022, incorrectly stated that NHTSA contacted DTNA on
September 13, 2022, when it should have stated that NHTSA contacted
DTNA on September 13, 2021.
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In the amended petition, DTNA contends that this second
noncompliance is also inconsequential because the ``limited context in
which the hazard lamps automatically activate ensures the message which
the hazard warning lamps is communicating is clear and does not confuse
other drivers about the meaning of the lamps.'' DTNA again explains the
phases of its ABA system and says that if the driver does not disengage
the ABA system, the system will apply the maximum braking force and
cause the truck to come to a complete stop. When the EB is activated
during the third and final phase, while the subject truck is traveling
at 20 mph or more, ``the hazard warning lamps are automatically
activated and flash at a rate of 140 Hz.'' Therefore, DTNA says, the
automatic activation of the hazard warning signal lamps would not occur
in stop and go traffic. DTNA notes that after the subject truck comes
to a complete stop, the hazard warning lamps revert to a standard flash
rate and ``the hazard warning signal operating unit can be manually
engaged by the driver'' throughout the ABA event.
DTNA then contends that the automatic activation of the hazard
warning signal lamps is consistent with two prior NHTSA interpretations
in which DTNA argues that ``the agency has found automatic activation
of the hazard warning signal operating unit to be appropriate in
certain circumstances.'' Specifically, DTNA claims that NHTSA's
November 18, 2016, interpretation letter to General Motors (GM) \10\
supports DTNA's position. In that interpretation letter, DTNA says that
NHTSA ``concluded that in the context of an adaptive cruise control
system, automatic activation of the hazard warning lamps was consistent
with FMVSS 108 if the human driver failed to respond to the system's
requests to regain control of the vehicle.''
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\10\ See NHTSA's letter to Brian Latouf, Executive Director, GM
(November 18, 2016) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/16-1289-gm-hazard-innovative-28-apr-16-rsy.
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DTNA argues the automatic activation of hazard warning signal lamps
is also consistent with the condition found in the interpretation
letter to GM.\11\ DTNA believes that SAE J910, January 1966 further
supports this argument and quotes the section which states: ``A
vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit is a driver controlled
device which causes all turn signal lamps to flash simultaneously to
indicate to the approaching drivers the presence of a vehicular
hazard.'' In addition, DTNA states that an appropriate use of hazard
warning lamps is ``to indicate that a vehicle is moving at a slower
rate of speed than surrounding traffic'' and refers to NHTSA's
interpretation letter to Senator Richard Lugar in support of this
claim. Therefore, DTNA contends that the noncompliant automatic
activation in the subject trucks ``is consistent with the type of
message the hazard lamps are intended to convey.'' \12\
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\11\ Id.
\12\ See Letter to Sen. Richard Lugar (May 9, 2000) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/21478ztv.
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DTNA concludes its petition by expressing its belief that the
subject noncompliances are inconsequential as they relate to motor
vehicle safety, and that its petition to be exempted from providing
notification of the noncompliances, as required by 49 U.S.C. 30118, and
a remedy for the noncompliances, as required by 49 U.S.C. 30120, should
be granted.
VI. NHTSA's Analysis
The burden of establishing the inconsequentiality of a failure to
comply with a performance requirement in an FMVSS is substantial and
difficult to meet. Accordingly, the Agency has not found many such
noncompliances inconsequential.\13\
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\13\ Cf. Gen. Motors Corporation; Ruling on Petition for
Determination of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 69 FR 19897, 19899
(Apr. 14, 2004) (citing prior cases where noncompliance was expected
to be imperceptible, or nearly so, to vehicle occupants or
approaching drivers).
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In determining inconsequentiality of a noncompliance, NHTSA focuses
on the safety risk to individuals who experience the type of event
against which a recall would otherwise protect.\14\ In general, NHTSA
does not consider the absence of complaints or injuries when
determining if a noncompliance is inconsequential to safety. The
absence of complaints does not mean vehicle occupants have not
experienced a safety issue, nor does it mean that there will not be
safety issues in the future.\15\
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\14\ See Gen. Motors, LLC; Grant of Petition for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 35355 (June 12, 2013) (finding
noncompliance had no effect on occupant safety because it had no
effect on the proper operation of the occupant classification system
and the correct deployment of an air bag); Osram Sylvania Prods.
Inc.; Grant of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential
Noncompliance, 78 FR 46000 (July 30, 2013) (finding occupant using
noncompliant light source would not be exposed to significantly
greater risk than occupant using similar compliant light source).
\15\ See Morgan 3 Wheeler Limited; Denial of Petition for
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 81 FR 21663, 21666 (Apr.
12, 2016); see also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 565 F.2d
754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding defect poses an unreasonable risk
when it ``results in hazards as potentially dangerous as sudden
engine fire, and where there is no dispute that at least some such
hazards, in this case fires, can definitely be expected to occur in
the future'').
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A. Noncompliance With FMVSS No. 108's Flash Rate Requirement
The Agency disagrees with DTNA that the increased flash rate during
the AEB event is negligible. Rather, the Agency believes that the
noncompliant flash rate is noticeable and concerning. Notably, the
increase in flash rate would not occur if automatic activation of the
hazard warning signal lamps were not present.
NHTSA disagrees with DTNA's assertion about the Agency's October
2007 study entitled ``Analyses of Rear-End Crashes and Near-Crashes . .
. '' (DOT HS 810 846), which DTNA cites to argue that NHTSA has
previously found that flashing warning lights under certain extreme
braking events may be regarded as a safer indicator for rear signaling.
NHTSA finds that the conclusions in the Agency's 2007 study do not
support a finding that DTNA's noncompliance is inconsequential to
vehicle safety for several reasons. First, DTNA's hazard warning signal
lamps are not equivalent to the enhanced rear-lighting system
referenced in the study. The study expressly pointed out that these
enhanced concepts are intended to supplement rather than replace
conventional rear signaling. Second, as explained in the study, the
research was performed by an external party and it explicitly states
that, ``the opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in
[[Page 17294]]
this publication are those of the authors--and not necessarily those
and do not represent opinions, findings, or conclusions of the U.S.
Department of Transportation or the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.'' \16\ Therefore, even if the Agency agreed with DTNA
about what this study says, the study would not serve as a
justification for companies not to comply with a motor vehicle safety
standard. Second, NHTSA considered this study in the context of DTNA's
petition for inconsequential noncompliance, and the Agency determined
that the study does not comprehensively address potential safety
problems resulting from this noncompliance. For example, the research
study did not evaluate whether rear signaling systems adversely affect
vehicle safety. Additionally, the research study was not designed to
examine all potential vehicle safety consequences caused by enhanced
rear signaling systems.\17\ Rather, the research study was limited to
evaluating whether enhanced rear signaling systems effectively caught
the attention of study participants and led to participants
subsequently applying their vehicle's brakes. Moreover, the research
study did not explore other factors which may include, but are not
limited to, an enhanced rear signaling system's potential to draw
attention away from all other vehicles, masking of lamps used by
emergency vehicles, impact on drivers of adjacent vehicles, and
potential to cause confusion. Third, while the 100-car naturalistic
research study did provide justification for various deceleration
criteria for enhanced rear-lighting systems, NHTSA believes additional
research is required before the overall effectiveness of enhanced rear-
lighting systems can be determined. Fourth, if, assuming arguendo,
NHTSA were to conclude that rear-lighting systems are indeed effective,
NHTSA would still need to promulgate a new regulation that adopts a
standardized protocol for attention-getting lamps that indicate
deceleration in lieu of or as a supplement to steady burning lamps,
which NHTSA's vehicle safety standard currently requires. Finally,
NHTSA has a longstanding position that standardized lighting during
braking events is important to vehicle safety--and promoting non-
standardized signaling would undermine that safety objective.
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\16\ Analyses of Rear-End Crashes and Near-Crashes in the 100-
Car Naturalistic Driving Study to Support Rear-Signaling
Countermeasure Development. DOT HS 810 846 (October 2007). See Page
3 of the PDF here: https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/analyses20of20rear-end20crashes20and20near-crashes20dot20hs2081020846.pdf.
\17\ Enhanced rear signaling systems is a term used throughout
the report, DOT HS 810 846, to refer to experimental rear signaling
systems.
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NHTSA also disagrees with DTNA's interpretation of Groendyke
Transportation's 30-month study, which found that a ``pulsating amber
brake light reduced rear-end collisions by roughly 34%.'' First, the
lamps that formed the basis of Groendyke's petition were part of an
additional brake-activated amber flashing auxiliary lamp--which is a
different type of system than DTNA's subject system--and importantly,
the vehicles on which they were installed retained the compliant
steady-burning brake lamps. Second, NHTSA finds that the data generated
by Groendyke's study is not statistically significant and there could
be any number of exogenous factors as to why the number of rear-end
collisions differ, which might not have anything to do with the
installation of the pulsating amber brake light. Third, the data
presented by Groendyke did not include detailed data on the types of
crashes experienced by its fleet, which NHTSA would need in order to
properly evaluate the effectiveness of Groendyke's additional lamps.
Therefore, the results of this study are questionable and not
applicable to other systems that modify the behavior of the required
lamps, as is the case in the subject petition.
DTNA states that NHTSA has previously granted petitions for
noncompliances similar to the noncompliant flash rate--where those
noncompliances only occur ``under specific and rare conditions,'' and
``were granted for short duration of occurrence.'' However, the Agency
is unable to properly address this assertion because DTNA did not
provide any data that would quantify the rarity of the subject
noncompliance. Nevertheless, we address each petition below in the
order it was cited.
DTNA claims in its petition that the Agency's June 18, 2001, grant
of a GM petition, 66 FR 32871, is an Agency decision that supports
DTNA's petition. The Agency disagrees with DTNA and finds that the
Agency's 2001 grant is irrelevant to both of DTNA's subject
noncompliances. In that decision, the Agency determined that the brief
single flash of the center high mounted stop lamp during the activation
of the hazard warning signal lamps as not rising to the level of
impairment that would detract or confuse other road users on the
meaning of the hazard warning signal lamp. In contrast, DTNA's system
may confuse other road users because it intentionally uses the hazard
warning signal lamps to indicate braking which is a non-standard
signal.
Next, DTNA refers to the Agency's February 22, 2018, grant of a GM
petition, 83 FR 7847, as an Agency decision that supports DTNA's
petition. The Agency again disagrees with DTNA because the
noncompliance at issue in the Agency's 2018 decision is not comparable
with DTNA's subject noncompliance due to a difference in the likelihood
of an occurrence. For example, GM's subject noncompliance occurred
under very limited and unusual circumstances, it was difficult to
recreate in laboratory settings, and it was highly unlikely to occur
under normal driving conditions.
DTNA provides three additional Agency decisions on
inconsequentiality petitions \18\ that the Agency believes are
irrelevant to DTNA's petition. These three petitions are all related to
various vehicle telltales (e.g., passenger airbag telltale, electronic
stability control telltale, and tire pressure monitoring system
telltale), which are only visible to the occupants within the vehicle
(i.e., drivers of other vehicles do not see the warnings). The impact
on other roadway users was not a primary consideration in evaluating
those petitions, and therefore, NHTSA finds that the Agency's decisions
on those petitions are not relevant to DTNA's petition.
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\18\ 78 FR 35355 (June 12, 2013), 84 FR 8151 (March 6, 2019),
and 81 FR 1676 (January 13, 2016).
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Finally, DTNA offers the Agency's November 4, 1996, grant of a GM
petition, which is also irrelevant to DTNA's petition. GM's petition
concerned intermittent operation of the turn signal self-canceling
feature, which caused the turn signal to continue to flash after the
affected vehicles completed a turn. Consequently, NHTSA considered the
impact on vehicle safety when an operator of an affected vehicle did
not notice that the turn signal continued to flash. The Agency's
decision on GM's petition is irrelevant because it concerned a vehicle
that had an alternate system--a chime--which served to remind the
operator to turn off the turn signal if the turn signal remained
activated for more than half a mile. Overall, the facts in GM's
petition are completely different from the subject petition and do not
concern either the hazard warning signal lamps or the intentional
activation of a non-standard signal.
B. Noncompliance Due to Automatic Activation of Hazard Warning Signal
Lamps
NHTSA does not agree with DTNA's assertion that its hazard warning
signal
[[Page 17295]]
lamps are similar to GM's hazard warning signal lamps, which NHTSA
discussed in an interpretation letter to GM.\19\ The NHTSA
interpretation letter that DTNA references pertains to GM's adaptive
cruise control system (herein referred to as ``Super Cruise'').
However, the differences between Super Cruise and DTNA's system are
notable. For example, the Super Cruise hazard warning signal lamps only
activate after the GM vehicles have come to a complete stop. In
contrast, DTNA's system operates while vehicles are in motion on a
roadway and traveling at various speeds. Another significant difference
is that with respect to Super Cruise, the actions that a vehicle
automatically takes only occur after the Super Cruise system determines
that a driver is unable or unwilling to take control of the vehicle
(e.g., the driver is incapacitated or unresponsive). In contrast, video
provided by DTNA appears to show that an affected truck may not have
come to a complete stop during the ABA event, or taken evasive
maneuvers--then the truck continued to move with traffic after the
event concluded. Furthermore, it appeared that DTNA's system kept the
hazard warning signal lamps activated--even after the Automatic
Emergency Braking (AEB) event concluded and the operator of the truck
maintained or increased the speed to match the flow of traffic.
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\19\ See NHTSA's letter to Brian Latouf, Executive Director, GM
(November 18, 2016) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/16-1289-gm-hazard-innovative-28-apr-16-rsy.
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While DTNA believes that this noncompliance is also inconsequential
because the ``limited context in which the hazard lamps automatically
activate ensures the message which the hazard warning lamps is
communicating is clear and does not confuse other drivers about the
meaning of the lamps,'' NHTSA disagrees. As NHTSA noted in the 2016
letter to GM, the purpose of the hazard warning is to indicate to
approaching drivers that the vehicle is stopped or is proceeding at a
slower rate than surrounding traffic. So, for example, we have opined
that the hazard lights may be automatically activated following a crash
\20\ or once the vehicle is stopped in or near the roadway by a ``Super
Cruise'' system after a human driver fails to respond \21\ because in
those situations there would be no ambiguity about the signal's meaning
(that the vehicle is stopped).
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\20\ See Letter to Timothy Bartlett (January 28, 2002) at
https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/23695ztv.
\21\ See Letter to Brian Latouf, Executive Director, GM
(November 18, 2016) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/16-1289-gm-hazard-innovative-28-apr-16-rsy.
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On the other hand, we have expressly found that automatic
activation of the hazard lights is not permitted to indicate a braking
event, such as ``hard'' braking. For example, in a letter to Steele
Enterprises, we opined that the hazards could not be automatically
activated upon application of a vehicle's anti-lock brake system.\22\
We affirmed this letter in our subsequent letter to Senator Lugar,
which DTNA cited in its petition. There, we noted that the system at
issue would automatically activate the vehicle's hazard warning system
``when a vehicle is rapidly braking.'' We opined that automatic
activation of the hazard lamps was not permitted in this situation
because it had the potential for confusing other motorists.\23\
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\22\ See Letter to Mark Steele, Steel Enterprises (October 7,
1999) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/20662ztv.
\23\ See Letter to Senator Lugar (May 9, 2000) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/21478ztv. See also Letter to Paul
Michelotti (January 5, 2001) (opining that FMVSS No. 108 does not
permit automatic activation of hazard warning lights ``under
circumstances of heavy braking or sudden stoppage'') at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/22403ztv.
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DTNA's reliance on the letter to Senator Lugar is therefore
misplaced. We disagree that the automatic activation in the subject
trucks--when the truck is in motion to indicate an emergency braking
event--is consistent with the type of message the hazard lamps are
intended to convey. We also disagree that the hazard warning lamps
remaining activated after the AEB event has concluded and the truck
resumes in motion is permitted. Neither case represents the
circumstances in which the hazard lights are customarily used.
Moreover, because the truck's stop lamps (which are steady-burning) are
activated in the second phase, activating the hazard lamps in the third
phase, should the attached trailer be configured to have a combined
stop lamp and turn signal lamp, would cause the stop lamps to flash. We
believe both of these aspects of the warning activation, either
separately or in combination, have the potential to confuse other
motorists that follow an affected truck. Finally, while DTNA states
that ``throughout the ABA event, the hazard warning signal operating
unit can be manually engaged by the driver,'' NHTSA believes this is an
irrelevant argument as DTNA's system automatically operates the hazard
warning signal lamps even when it is not manually activated.
VII. NHTSA's Decision
In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that DTNA has
not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108
noncompliances are inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.
Accordingly, DTNA's petition is hereby denied and DTNA is obligated to
provide notification of and free remedy for the noncompliances under 49
U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.
(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30118, 30120: delegations of authority at 49
CFR 1.95 and 501.8.)
Anne L. Collins,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023-05901 Filed 3-21-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P