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Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959)

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Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959)
United States Supreme Court

From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
 
Case:   BIBB V. NAVAJO FREIGHT LINES

Case #: 359US520


NO. 94.  ARGUED MARCH 30-31, 1959 - DECIDED MAY 25, 1959 - 159 F. SUPP.
385, AFFIRMED. 


AS APPLIED TO INTERSTATE MOTOR CARRIERS OPERATING UNDER CERTIFICATES
OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY ISSUED BY THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION, THE ILLINOIS STATUTE HERE INVOLVED, WHICH REQUIRES TRUCKS
AND TRAILERS OPERATING ON THAT STATE'S HIGHWAYS TO BE EQUIPPED WITH A
SPECIFIED TYPE OF REAR FENDER MUDGUARD WHICH WOULD BE ILLEGAL IN
ARKANSAS, WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE PERMITTED IN AT LEAST 45 OTHER
STATES, AND WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY INTERFERE WITH THE "INTERLINE"
OPERATIONS OF MOTOR CARRIERS, IS INVALID BECAUSE IT UNDULY AND
UNREASONABLY BURDENS INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN VIOLATION OF ART. I, SEC. 8
OF THE CONSTITUTION.  PP. 521-530. 

(A)  EVEN STATE SAFETY REGULATIONS MUST YIELD WHEN THEY RUN AFOUL OF
THE POLICY OF FREE TRADE REFLECTED IN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.  PP. 523
524, 528-529. 

(B)  INTERCHANGING MUDGUARDS ON TRUCKS AND TRAILERS AT THE BORDER OF
ILLINOIS IS A TIME-CONSUMING TASK; AND THE NECESSITY TO USE WELDING
MIGHT MEAN THAT SOME TRUCKS OR TRAILERS WOULD HAVE TO BE UNLOADED AND
LOADED AGAIN - ALL OF WHICH ADDS UP TO A SERIOUS BURDEN ON INTERSTATE
COMMERCE NOT JUSTIFIED BY A COMPELLING NEED FOR THIS NEW SAFETY
MEASURE.  PP. 527-528. 

(C)  THE RECORD IN THIS CASE SHOWS THAT THIS IS ONE OF THOSE
EXCEPTIONAL CASES WHERE A STATE SAFETY REGULATION IN THE EXERCISE OF
THE POLICE POWER PLACES SUCH A HEAVY BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
UNCOMPENSATED BY COMPELLING ADVANTAGES OF SAFETY, THAT IT VIOLATES THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE.  PP. 529-530. 

BIBB, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF ILLINOIS, ET AL. V.
NAVAJO FREIGHT LINES, INC., ET AL. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. 

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. 

WE ARE ASKED IN THIS CASE TO HOLD THAT AN ILLINOIS STATUTE (FN1)
REQUIRING THE USE OF A CERTAIN TYPE OF REAR FENDER MUDGUARD ON TRUCKS
AND TRAILERS OPERATED ON THE HIGHWAYS OF THAT STATE CONFLICTS WITH THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.  THE STATUTORY SPECIFICATION FOR
THIS TYPE OF MUDGUARD PROVIDES THAT THE GUARD SHALL CONTOUR THE REAR
WHEEL, WITH THE INSIDE SURFACE BEING RELATIVELY PARALLEL TO THE TOP 90
DEGREES OF THE REAR 180 DEGREES OF THE WHOLE SURFACE.  (FN2)  THE
SURFACE OF THE GUARD MUST EXTEND DOWNWARD TO WITHIN 10 INCHES FROM THE
GROUND WHEN THE TRUCK IS LOADED TO ITS MAXIMUM LEGAL CAPACITY.  THE
GUARDS MUST BE WIDE ENOUGH TO COVER THE WIDTH OF THE PROTECTED TIRE,
MUST BE INSTALLED NOT MORE THAN 6 INCHES FROM THE TIRE SURFACE WHEN THE
VEHICLE IS LOADED TO MAXIMUM CAPACITY, AND MUST HAVE A LIP OR FLANGE ON
ITS OUTER EDGE OF NOT LESS THAN 2 INCHES.  (FN3) 

APPELLEES, INTERSTATE MOTOR CARRIERS HOLDING CERTIFICATES FROM THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, CHALLENGED THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
ILLINOIS ACT.  A SPECIFICALLY CONSTITUTED THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT
CONCLUDED THAT IT UNDULY AND UNREASONABLY BURDENED AND OBSTRUCTED
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, BECAUSE IT MADE THE CONVENTIONAL OR STRAIGHT
MUDFLAP, WHICH IS LEGAL IN AT LEAST 45 STATES, ILLEGAL IN ILLINOIS, AND
BECAUSE THE STATUTE, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH A RULE OF THE ARKANSAS
COMMERCE COMMISSION (FN4) REQUIRING STRAIGHT MUDFLAPS, RENDERED THE USE
OF THE SAME MOTOR VEHICLE EQUIPMENT IN BOTH STATES IMPOSSIBLE.  THE
STATUTE WAS DECLARED TO BE VIOLATIVE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
APPELLANTS WERE ENJOINED FROM ENFORCING IT.  159 F. SUPP. 385.  AN
APPEAL WAS TAKEN AND WE NOTED PROBABLE JURISDICTION.  358 U.S. 808. 

THE POWER OF THE STATE TO REGULATE THE USE OF ITS HIGHWAYS IS BROAD
AND PERVASIVE.  WE HAVE RECOGNIZED THE PECULIARLY LOCAL NATURE OF THIS
SUBJECT OF SAFETY, AND HAVE UPHELD STATE STATUTES APPLICABLE ALIKE TO
INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE COMMERCE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY MAY HAVE
AN IMPACT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.  SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY DEPT. V.
BARNWELL BROS., 303 U.S. 177; MAURER V. HAMILTON, 309 U.S. 598; SPROLES
V. BINFORD, 286 U.S. 374.  THE REGULATION OF HIGHWAYS "IS AKIN TO
QUARANTINE MEASURES, GAME LAWS, AND LIKE LOCAL REGULATIONS OF RIVERS,
HARBORS, PIERS, AND DOCKS, WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE STATE HAS
EXCEPTIONAL SCOPE FOR THE EXERCISE OF ITS REGULATORY POWER, AND WHICH,
CONGRESS NOT ACTING HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED EVEN THOUGH THEY MATERIALLY
INTERFERE WITH INTERSTATE COMMERCE."  SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. V. ARIZONA,
325 U.S. 761, 783. 

THESE SAFETY MEASURES CARRY A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY WHEN
CHALLENGED IN COURT.  IF THERE ARE ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF SOLVING A
PROBLEM, WE DO NOT SIT TO DETERMINE WHICH OF THEM IS BEST SUITED TO
ACHIEVE A VALID STATE OBJECTIVE.  POLICY DECISIONS ARE FOR THE STATE
LEGISLATURE, ABSENT FEDERAL ENTRY INTO THE FIELD.  (FN5)  UNLESS WE CAN
CONCLUDE ON THE WHOLE RECORD THAT "THE TOTAL EFFECT OF THE LAW AS A
SAFETY MEASURE IN REDUCING ACCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES IS SO SLIGHT OR
PROBLEMATICAL AS NOT TO OUTWEIGH THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN KEEPING
INTERSTATE COMMERCE FREE FROM INTERFERENCES WHICH SERIOUSLY IMPEDE IT"
(SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. V. ARIZONA, SUPRA, PP. 775-776) WE MUST UPHOLD
THE STATUTE. 

THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND THAT "SINCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A CARRIER
OPERATING IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE TO DETERMINE WHICH OF ITS EQUIPMENT
WILL BE USED IN A PARTICULAR AREA, OR ON A PARTICULAR DAY, OR DAYS,
CARRIERS OPERATING INTO OR THROUGH ILLINOIS  ..  WIILL BE REQUIRED TO
EQUIP ALL THEIR TRAILERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
ILLINOIS SPLASH GUARD STATUTE."  WITH TWO POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS THE
MUDFLAPS REQUIRED IN THOSE STATES WHICH HAVE MUDGUARD REGULATIONS WOULD
NOT MEET THE STANDARDS REQUIRED BY THE ILLINOIS STATUTE.  THE COST OF
INSTALLING THE CONTOUR MUDGUARDS IS $30 OR MORE PER VEHICLE.  THE
DISTRICT COURT FOUND THAT THE INITIAL COST OF INSTALLING THOSE
MUDGUARDS ON ALL THE TRUCKS OWNED BY THE APPELLEES RANGED FROM $4,500
TO $45,840.  THERE WAS ALSO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO INDICATE THAT THE
COST OF MAINTENANCE AND REPLACEMENT OF THESE GUARDS IS SUBSTANTIAL. 

ILLINOIS INTRODUCED EVIDENCE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH THAT CONTOUR
MUDGUARDS HAD A DECIDED SAFETY FACTOR IN THAT THEY PREVENTED THE
THROWING OF DEBRIS INTO THE FACES OF DRIVERS OF PASSING CARS AND INTO
THE WINDSHIELDS OF A FOLLOWING VEHICLE.  BUT THE DISTRICT COURT IN ITS
OPINION STATED THAT IT WAS "CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT THE CONTOUR MUD
FLAP POSSESSES NO ADVANTAGES OVER THE CONVENTIONAL OR STRAIGHT MUD FLAP
PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED IN ILLINOIS AND PRESENTLY REQUIRED IN MOST OF THE
STATES" (159 F. SUPP., AT 388) AND THAT "THERE IS RATHER CONVINCING
TESTIMONY THAT USE OF THE CONTOUR FLAP CREATES HAZARDS PREVIOUSLY
UNKNOWN TO THOSE USING THE HIGHWAYS."  ID., AT 390.  THESE HAZARDS WERE
FOUND TO BE OCCASIONED BY THE FACT THAT THIS NEW TYPE OF MUDGUARD
TENDED TO CAUSE AN ACCUMULATION OF HEAT IN THE BRAKE DRUM, THUS
DECREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BRAKES, AND BY THE FACT THAT THEY WERE
SUSCEPTIBLE OF BEING HIT AND BUMPED WHEN THE TRUCKS WERE BACKED UP AND
OF FALLING OFF ON THE HIGHWAY. 

THESE FINDINGS ON COST AND ON SAFETY ARE NOT THE END OF OUR PROBLEM. 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE WEIGHT OF TRUCKS USING THE HIGHWAYS UPHELD IN
SPROLES V. BINFORD, SUPRA, ALSO INVOLVED INCREASED FINANCIAL BURDENS
FOR INTERSTATE CARRIERS.  STATE CONTROL OF THE WIDTH AND WEIGHT OF
MOTOR TRUCKS AND TRAILERS SUSTAINED IN SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY DEPT. V.
BARNWELL BROS., SUPRA, INVOLVED NICE QUESTIONS OF JUDGMENT CONCERNING
THE NEED OF THOSE REGULATIONS SO FAR AS THE ISSUE OF SAFETY WAS
CONCERNED.  THAT CASE ALSO PRESENTED THE PROBLEM WHETHER INTERSTATE
MOTOR CARRIERS, WHO WERE REQUIRED TO REPLACE ALL EQUIPMENT OR KEEP OUT
OF THE STATE, SUFFERED AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINT ON INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.  THE MATTER OF SAFETY WAS SAID TO BE ONE ESSENTIALLY FOR THE
LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT; AND THE BURDEN OF REDESIGNING OR REPLACING
EQUIPMENT WAS SAID TO BE A PROPER PRICE TO EXACT FROM INTERSTATE AND
INTRASTATE MOTOR CARRIERS ALIKE.  AND THE SAME CONCLUSION WAS REACHED
IN MAURER V. HAMILTON, SUPRA, WHERE A STATE LAW PROHIBITED ANY MOTOR
CARRIER FROM CARRYING ANY OTHER VEHICLE ABOVE THE CAB OF THE CARRIER
VEHICLE OR OVER THE HEAD OF THE OPERATOR OF THAT VEHICLE.  COST TAKEN
INTO CONSIDERATION WITH OTHER FACTORS MIGHT BE RELEVANT IN SOME CASES
TO BE THE ISSUE OF BURDEN ON COMMERCE.  BUT IT HAS ASSUMED NO SUCH
PROPORTIONS HERE.  IF WE HAD HERE ONLY A QUESTION WHETHER THE COST OF
ADJUSTING AN INTERSTATE OPERATION TO THESE NEW LOCAL SAFETY REGULATIONS
PRESCRIBED BY ILLINOIS UNDULY BURDENED INTERSTATE COMMERCE, WE WOULD
HAVE TO SUSTAIN THE LAW UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SPROLES, BARNWELL,
AND MAURER CASES.  THE SAME RESULT WOULD OBTAIN IF WE HAD TO RESOLVE
THE MUCH DISCUSSED ISSUES OF SAFETY PRESENTED IN THIS CASE. 

THIS CASE PRESENTS A DIFFERENT ISSUE.  THE EQUIPMENT IN THE SPROLES,
BARNWELL, AND MAURER CASES COULD PASS MUSTER IN ANY STATE, SO FAR AS
THE RECORDS IN THOSE CASES REVEAL.  WE WERE NOT FACED THERE WITH THE
QUESTION WHETHER ONE STATE COULD PRESCRIBE STANDARDS FOR INTERSTATE
CARRIERS THAT WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE STANDARDS OF ANOTHER STATE,
MAKING IT NECESSARY, SAY, FOR AN INTERSTATE CARRIER TO SHIFT ITS CARGO
TO DIFFERENTLY DESIGNED VEHICLES ONCE ANOTHER STATE LINE WAS REACHED. 
WE HAD A RELATED PROBLEM IN SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. V. ARIZONA, SUPRA,
WHERE THE COURT INVALIDATED A STATUTE OF ARIZONA PRESCRIBING A MAXIMUM
LENGTH OF 70 CARS FOR FREIGHT TRAINS MOVING THROUGH THAT STATE.  MORE
CLOSELY IN POINT IS MORGAN V. VIRGINIA, 328 U.S. 373, WHERE A LOCAL LAW
REQUIRED A RESEATING OF PASSENGERS ON INTERSTATE BUSSES ENTERING
VIRGINIA IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH A LOCAL SEGREGATION LAW.  DIVERSE
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT RACES IMPOSED BY SEVERAL
STATES INTERFERED, WE CONCLUDED, WITH "THE NEED FOR NATIONAL UNIFORMITY
IN THE REGULATIONS FOR INTERSTATE TRAVEL."  ID., AT 386.  THOSE CASES
INDICATE THE DIMENSIONS OF OUR PRESENT PROBLEM. 

AN ORDER OF THE ARKANSAS COMMERCE COMMISSION, ALREADY MENTIONED,
(FN6) REQUIRES THAT TRAILERS OPERATING IN THAT STATE BE EQUIPPED WITH
STRAIGHT OR CONVENTIONAL MUDFLAPS.  VEHICLES EQUIPPED TO MEET THE
STANDARDS OF THE ILLINOIS STATUTE WOULD NOT COMPLY WITH ARKANSAS
STANDARDS, AND VICE VERSA.   THUS IF A TRAILER IS TO BE OPERATED IN
BOTH STATES, MUDGUARDS WOULD HAVE TO BE INTERCHANGED, CAUSING A
SIGNIFICANT DELAY IN AN OPERATION WHERE PROMPT MOVEMENT MAY BE OF THE
ESSENCE.  IT WAS FOUND THAT FROM TWO TO FOUR HOURS OF LABOR ARE
REQUIRED TO INSTALL OR REMOVE A CONTOUR MUDGUARD.  MOREOVER, THE
CONTOUR GUARD IS ATTACHED TO THE TRAILER BY WELDING AND IF THE TRAILER
IS CONVEYING A CARGO OF EXPLOSIVES (E.G., FOR THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT) IT WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS TO ATTEMPT TO WELD ON A
CONTOUR MUDGUARD WITHOUT UNLOADING THE TRAILER. 

IT WAS ALSO FOUND THAT THE ILLINOIS STATUTE SERIOUSLY INTERFERES WITH
THE "INTERLINE" OPERATIONS OF MOTOR CARRIERS - THAT IS TO SAY, WITH THE
INTERCHANGING OF TRAILERS BETWEEN AN ORIGINATING CARRIER AND ANOTHER
CARRIER WHEN THE LATTER SERVES AN AREA NOT SERVED BY THE FORMER.  THESE
"INTERLINE" OPERATIONS PROVIDE A SPEEDY THROUGH-SERVICE FOR THE
SHIPPER.  INTERLINING CONTEMPLATES THE PHYSICAL TRANSFER OF THE ENTIRE
TRAILER; THERE IS NO UNLOADING AND RELOADING OF THE CARGO.  THE
INTERLINING PROCESS IS PARTICULARLY VITAL IN CONNECTION WITH SHIPMENT
OF PERISHABLES, WHICH WOULD SPOIL IF UNLOADED BEFORE REACHING THEIR
DESTINATION, OR WITH THE MOVEMENT OF EXPLOSIVES CARRIED UNDER SEAL.  OF
COURSE, IF THE ORIGINATING CARRIER NEVER OPERATED IN ILLINOIS, IT WOULD
NOT BE EXPECTED TO EQUIP ITS TRAILERS WITH CONTOUR MUDGUARDS.  YET IF
AN INTERCHANGED TRAILER OF THAT CARRIER WERE HAULED TO OR THROUGH
ILLINOIS, THE STATUTE WOULD REQUIRE THAT IT CONTAIN CONTOUR GUARDS. 
SINCE CARRIERS WHICH OPERATE IN AND THROUGH ILLINOIS CANNOT COMPEL THE
ORIGINATING CARRIERS TO EQUIP THEIR TRAILERS WITH CONTOUR GUARDS, THEY
MAY BE FORCED TO CEASE INTERLINING WITH THOSE WHO DO NOT MEET THE
ILLINOIS REQUIREMENTS.  OVER 60 PERCENT OF THE BUSINESS OF 5 OF THE 6
PLAINTIFFS IS INTERLINE TRAFFIC.  FOR THE OTHER IT CONSTITUTES 30
PERCENT.  ALL OF THE PLAINTIFFS OPERATE EXTENSIVELY IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, AND THE ANNUAL MILEAGE IN ILLINOIS OF NONE OF THEM EXCEEDS 7
PERCENT OF TOTAL MILEAGE. 

THIS IN SUMMARY IS THE RATHER MASSIVE SHOWING OF BURDEN ON INTERSTATE
COMMERCE WHICH APPELLEES MADE AT THE HEARING. 

APPELLANTS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO REBUT THE APPELLEES' SHOWING THAT THE
STATUTE IN QUESTION SEVERELY BURDENS INTERSTATE COMMERCE.  APPELLANTS'
SHOWING WAS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING THAT CONTOUR MUDGUARDS PREVENTED THE
THROWING OF DEBRIS INTO THE FACES OF DRIVERS OF PASSING CARS AND INTO
THE WINDSHIELDS OF A FOLLOWING VEHICLE.  THEY CONCLUDE THAT, BECAUSE
THE ILLINOIS STATUTE IS A REASONABLE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER, A
FEDERAL COURT IS PRECLUDED FROM WEIGHING THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE
CONTOUR MUDGUARD AGAINST ANY OTHER KIND OF MUDGUARD AND MUST SUSTAIN
THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXTENT OF THE BURDEN IT
IMPOSES ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.  THEY RELY IN THE MAIN ON SOUTH
CAROLINA HIGHWAY DEPT. V. BARNWELL BROS., SUPRA.  THERE IS LANGUAGE IN
THAT OPINION WHICH, READ IN ISOLATION FROM SUCH LATER DECISIONS AS
SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. V. ARIZONA, SUPRA, AND MORGAN V. VIRGINIA, SUPRA,
WOULD SUGGEST THAT NO SHOWING OF BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE IS
SUFFICIENT TO INVALIDATE LOCAL SAFETY REGULATIONS IN ABSENCE OF SOME
ELEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 

THE VARIOUS EXERCISES BY THE STATES OF THEIR POLICE POWER STAND,
HOWEVER, ON AN EQUAL FOOTING.  ALL ARE ENTITLED TO THE SAME PRESUMPTION
OF VALIDITY WHEN CHALLENGED UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.  LINCOLN UNION V. NORTHWESTERN CO., 335 U.S. 525;
DAY-BRITE LIGHTING, INC., V. MISSOURI, 342 U.S. 421; WILLIAMSON V. LEE
OPTICAL CO., 348 U.S. 483.  SIMILARLY THE VARIOUS STATE REGULATORY
STATUTES ARE OF EQUAL DIGNITY WHEN MEASURED AGAINST THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE.  LOCAL REGULATIONS WHICH WOULD PASS MUSTER UNDER THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE MIGHT NONETHELESS FAIL TO SURVIVE OTHER CHALLENGES TO
CONSTITUTIONALITY THAT BRING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE INTO PLAY.  LIKE ANY
LOCAL LAW THAT CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL REGULATORY MEASURES.  (CALIFORNIA
COMM'N V. UNITED STATES, 355 U.S. 534; SERVICE STORAGE & TRANSFER CO.
V. VIRGINIA, 359 U.S. 171), STATE REGULATIONS THAT RUN AFOUL OF THE
POLICY OF FREE TRADE REFLECTED IN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE MUST ALSO BOW. 

THIS IS ONE OF THOSE CASES - FEW IN NUMBER - WHERE LOCAL SAFETY
MEASURES THAT ARE NONDISCRIMINATORY PLACE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL BURDEN ON
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.  THIS CONCLUSION IS ESPECIALLY UNDERLINED BY THE
DELETERIOUS EFFECT WHICH THE ILLINOIS LAW WILL HAVE ON THE "INTERLINE"
OPERATION OF INTERSTATE MOTOR CARRIERS.  THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
ARKANSAS REGULATION AND THE ILLINOIS REGULATION ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THIS
REGULATION OF MUDGUARDS IS NOT ONE OF THOSE MATTERS "ADMITTING OF
DIVERSITY OF TREATMENT, ACCORDING TO THE SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OF LOCAL
CONDITIONS," TO USE THE WORDS OF CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES IN SPROLES V.
BINFORD, SUPRA, AT 390.  A STATE WHICH INSISTS ON A DESIGN OUT OF LINE
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ALMOST ALL THE OTHER STATES MAY SOMETIMES
PLACE A GREAT BURDEN OF DELAY AND INCONVENIENCE ON THOSE INTERSTATE
MOTOR CARRIERS ENTERING OR CROSSING ITS TERRITORY.  SUCH A NEW SAFETY
DEVICE - OUT OF LINE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE OTHER STATES - MAY BE
SO COMPELLING THAT THE INNOVATING STATE NEED NOT BE THE ONE TO GIVE
WAY.  BUT THE PRESENT SHOWING - BALANCED AGAINST THE CLEAR BURDEN ON
COMMERCE - IS FAR TOO INCONCLUSIVE TO MAKE THIS MUDGUARD MEET THAT
TEST. 

WE DEAL NOT WITH ABSOLUTES BUT WITH QUESTIONS OF DEGREE.  THE STATE
LEGISLATURES PLAINLY HAVE GREAT LEEWAY IN PROVIDING SAFETY REGULATIONS
FOR ALL VEHICLES - INTERSTATE AS WELL AS LOCAL.  OUR DECISIONS SO
HOLD.  YET THE HEAVY BURDEN WHICH THE ILLINOIS MUDGUARD LAW PLACES ON
THE INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF TRUCKS AND TRAILERS SEEMS TO US TO PASS THE
PERMISSIBLE LIMITS EVEN FOR SAFETY REGULATIONS.  AFFIRMED. 

FN1  THE STATE STATUTE (EFFECTIVE JULY 8, 1957) IN RELEVANT PART
PROVIDES: 

"IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE OF THE
SECOND DIVISION UPON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE OUTSIDE THE CORPORATE
LIMITS OF A CITY, VILLAGE OR INCORPORATED TOWN UNLESS SUCH VEHICLE IS
EQUIPPED WITH REAR FENDER SPLASH GUARDS WHICH SHALL COMPLY WITH THE
SPECIFICATIONS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION; EXCEPT THAT ANY
MOTOR VEHICLE OF THE SECOND DIVISION WHICH IS OR HAS BEEN PURCHASED,
NEW OR USED, PRIOR TO AUGUST 1, 1957 SHALL BE EQUIPPED WITH REAR FENDER
SPLASH GUARDS WHICH ARE SO ATTACHED AS TO PREVENT THE SPLASHING OF MUD
OR WATER UPON THE WINDSHIELD OF OTHER MOTOR VEHICLES AND SUCH SPLASH
GUARDS ON SUCH VEHICLE SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE
SPECIFICATIONS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION UNTIL JANUARY 1,
1958. 

"THE REAR FENDER SPLASH GUARDS SHALL CONTOUR THE WHEEL IN SUCH A
MANNER THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE INSIDE SURFACE OF ANY SUCH SPLASH
GUARD TO THE TREAD SURFACE OF THE TIRE OR WHEEL SHALL BE RELATIVELY
PARALLEL, BOTH LATERALLY OR ACROSS THE WHEEL, AT LEAST THROUGHOUT THE
TOP 90 DEGREES OF THE REAR 180 DEGREES OF THE WHEEL SURFACE; PROVIDED
HOWEVER, ON VEHICLES WHICH HAVE A CLEARANCE OF LESS THAN 5 INCHES
BETWEEN THE TOP OF THE TIRE OR WHEEL AND THAT PART OF THE BODY OF THE
VEHICLE DIRECTLY ABOVE THE TIRE OR WHEEL WHEN THE VEHICLE IS LOADED TO
MAXIMUM LEGAL CAPACITY, THE CURVED PORTION OF THE SPLASH GUARD NEED
ONLY EXTEND FROM A POINT DIRECTLY BEHIND THE CENTER OF THE REAR AXLE
AND TO THE REAR OF THE WHEEL SURFACE UPWARDS TO WITHIN AT LEAST 2
INCHES OF THE BOTTOM LINE OF THE BODY WHEN THE VEHICLE IS LOADED TO
MAXIMUM LEGAL CAPACITY.  ON ALL VEHICLES TO WHICH THIS SECTION APPLIES,
THERE SHALL BE A DOWNWARD EXTENSION OF THE CURVED SURFACE WHICH SHALL
END NOT MORE THAN 10 INCHES FROM THE GROUND WHEN THE VEHICLE IS LOADED
TO MAXIMUM LEGAL CAPACITY.  THIS DOWNWARD EXTENSION SHALL BE PART OF
THE CURVED SURFACE OR ATTACHED DIRECTLY TO SAID CURVED SURFACE, BUT IT
NEED NOT CONTOUR THE WHEEL. 

"THE SPLASH GUARDS SHALL BE WIDE ENOUGH TO COVER THE FULL TREAD OR
TREADS OF THE TIRES BEING PROTECTED AND SHALL BE INSTALLED NOT MORE
THAN 6 INCHES FROM THE TREAD SURFACE OF THE TIRE OR WHEEL WHEN THE
VEHICLE IS LOADED TO MAXIMUM LEGAL CAPACITY.  THE SPLASH GUARD SHALL
HAVE A LIP OR FLANGE ON ITS OUTSIDE EDGE TO MINIMIZE SIDE THROW AND
SPLASH.  THE LIP OR FLANGE SHALL EXTEND TOWARD THE CENTER OF THE WHEEL,
AND SHALL BE PERPENDICULAR TO AND EXTEND NOT LESS THAN 2 INCHES BELOW
THE INSIDE OR BOTTOM SURFACE LINE OR PLANE OF THE GUARD. 

"THE SPLASH GUARDS MAY BE CONSTRUCTED OF A RIGID OR FLEXIBLE
MATERIAL, BUT SHALL BE ATTACHED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT, REGARDLESS OF
MOVEMENT, EITHER BY THE SPLASH GUARDS OR THE VEHICLE, THE SPLASH GUARDS
WILL RETAIN THEIR GENERAL PARALLEL RELATIONSHIP TO THE TREAD SURFACE OF
THE TIRE OR WHEEL UNDER ALL ORDINARY OPERATING CONDITIONS."  ILL. REV.
STAT., 1957, C. 95 1/2, SEC. 218B. 

MOTOR VEHICLES OF THE SECOND DIVISION ARE DEFINED AS "THOSE VEHICLES
WHICH ARE DESIGNED AND USED FOR PULLING OR CARRYING FREIGHT AND ALSO
THOSE VEHICLES OR MOTOR CARS WHICH ARE DESIGNED AND USED FOR THE
CARRYING OF MORE THAN SEVEN PERSONS."  ILL. REV. STAT., 1957, C. 95
1/2, SEC. 99(B). 

FN2  THE SPECIFICATIONS ARE SOMEWHAT MODIFIED IF THE CLEARANCE
BETWEEN THE TOP OF THE TIRE AND THE BODY OF THE VEHICLE DIRECTLY ABOVE
IT IS LESS THAN 5 INCHES WHEN THE VEHICLE IS LOADED TO ITS MAXIMUM
LEGAL CAPACITY. 

FN3  THERE ARE CERTAIN EXEMPTIONS FROM THE STATUTE, BUT THEIR
VALIDITY OR THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE IN LIGHT OF THEM IS NOT
QUESTIONED HERE.  BUT SEE RUDOLPH EXPRESS CO. V. BIBB, 15 ILL. 2D 76,
153 N.E.2D 820.  NO CONTENTION IS HERE MADE THAT THE STATUTE
DISCRIMINATES AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT ITS
PROVISIONS APPLY ALIKE TO VEHICLES IN INTRASTATE AS WELL AS IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.  NOR IS IT CONTENDED THAT THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.  CF. PEOPLE V. WARREN,
11 ILL. 2D 420, 143 N.E.2D 28. 

FN4  ARKANSAS COMMERCE COMMISSION RULE 100, DECEMBER 13, 1957. 

FN5  IT IS NOT ARGUED THAT THERE HAS BEEN A PRE-EMPTION OF THE FIELD
BY FEDERAL REGULATION.  WHILE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION HAS,
PURSUANT TO SEC. 204(A) OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT (49 STAT. 546,
49 U.S.C. SEC. 304(A)), PROMULGATED ITS MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY
REGULATIONS TO GOVERN VEHICLES OPERATING IN INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN
COMMERCE (SEE 49 CFR, PTS.  190-197), IT HAS EXPRESSLY DECLINED TO
ESTABLISH ANY REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING WHEEL FLAPS, AND HAS DISCLAIMED
ANY INTENTION TO OCCUPY THE FIELD OR ABROGATE STATE REGULATIONS NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH ITS STANDARDS.  54 M.C.C. 337, 354, 358. 

FN6  NOTE 4, SUPRA. 

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, WHOM MR. JUSTICE STEWART JOINS, CONCURRING. 

THE OPINION OF THE COURT CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THE HEAVY BURDEN, IN
TERMS OF COST AND INTERFERENCE WITH "INTERLINING," WHICH THE ILLINOIS
STATUTE HERE INVOLVED IMPOSES ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.  IN VIEW OF THE
FINDINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT, SUMMARIZED ON PAGE 525 OF THE COURT'S
OPINION AND FULLY JUSTIFIED BY THE RECORD, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
CONTOUR MUDFLAP "POSSESSES NO ADVANTAGES" IN TERMS OF SAFETY OVER THE
CONVENTIONAL FLAP PERMITTED IN ALL OTHER STATES, AND INDEED CREATES
CERTAIN SAFETY HAZARDS, THIS HEAVY BURDEN CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE
THEORY THAT THE ILLINOIS STATUTE IS A NECESSARY, APPROPRIATE, OR
HELPFUL LOCAL SAFETY MEASURE.  ACCORDINGLY, I CONCUR IN THE JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT.

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